> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.evently.market/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.evently.market/security/overview.md). # Security Overview ## Approach evently's security process is structured in three phases: ``` Phase 1 — AI audits (7 engines) + automated tools ← completed Phase 2 — Professional third-party audit ← two independent firms scheduled Phase 3 — Ongoing monitoring + bug bounty ← post-launch ``` All findings, fixes, and the contracts reviewed at each stage are documented publicly in this documentation and in the GitHub repository. *** ## AI Security Audits All evently contracts underwent multi-round security review using **7 AI engines** with a 3-round methodology (Systematic review → Economic analysis → Triage). The contracts reviewed are: **EventlyProfiles.sol v1.3** and **EventlyMarkets.sol (LMSR, b=200)**. | AI Tool | Contracts | Findings | Status | | --------------- | ------------------------------ | -------- | ---------------------------- | | Claude Opus 4.6 | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 6 | All resolved or acknowledged | | GPT-4o | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 13 | All resolved or acknowledged | | Gemini 1.5 Pro | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 9 | All resolved or acknowledged | | Grok (xAI) | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 6 | All resolved or acknowledged | | DeepSeek R1 | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 7 | All resolved or acknowledged | | Qwen3.5 | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 4 | All resolved or acknowledged | | Perplexity | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | — | All resolved or acknowledged | **All 7 AI engines reviewed EventlyMarkets (LMSR).** Key cross-tool findings documented in [Consolidated AI Audit](/security/pre-audit-consolidated.md). *** ## Automated Tool Scans 22 automated security tools completed, following the methodology recommended by [z0r0z/majeur](https://github.com/z0r0z/majeur). Individual reports are linked in the Audit Reports section. *** ## Third-Party Audits Two independent professional audits are scheduled for Q2 2026. Firms were selected based on availability, scope fit, and budget. Formal audit reports will be published here upon completion. *** ## Security Properties ### Reentrancy Fund-moving functions use a custom inline `nonReentrant` mutex (`_locked` flag — not the OZ import). CEI (Checks-Effects-Interactions) enforced throughout. All AI audits confirmed: **0 reentrancy vulnerabilities found in active paths**. `nonReentrant` added to `resolveMarket`, `cancelMarket`, `slashMarket`, `claimCreatorFees`, `reclaimCancelledOrder` . ### Pull Payment All payouts use pull-payment: winners call `redeemWinnings()`, cancelled-market holders call `claimCancelRefund()`, creators call `claimCreatorFees()`. No push to arbitrary addresses. Lazy refund for cancelled CLOB orders via `reclaimCancelledOrder()`. ### Treasury Resilience Treasury fees accumulate in `treasuryBalance` (no external transfer on every trade). Withdrawals are two-step with a 24-hour timelock: `requestTreasuryWithdrawal()` → wait 24h → `executeTreasuryWithdrawal()`. Admin can cancel before execution. Prevents rug-pull . ### Access Control | Modifier | Who | Used on | | --------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | | `onlyAdmin` | Admin multisig | Slash, pause, ban, whitelist management, treasury, admin cancel | | `onlyDisputeResolver` | Dedicated resolver address | `settleDispute()` only | | `onlyMarketCreator` | `marketCreatorWhitelisted[addr]` or admin | `createMarket`, `createImportedMarket` | | `onlyWhitelisted` | `whitelisted[addr]` | Trading functions (beta only; disabled at public launch) | | `whenNotPaused` | — | All trading and market creation | Admin and `disputeResolver` are **separate roles** — admin cannot unilaterally settle disputes. Resolver pool address changes are also timelocked (24h). ### Emergency Controls **Pause:** `pause()` (admin only). Blocks all trading and market creation via `whenNotPaused`. Auto-expires after **72 hours** (`MAX_PAUSE_DURATION`). After expiry, anyone can call `unpause()` — prevents permanent lockout by a compromised admin key. **Ban:** `banAddress(addr)` / `unbanAddress(addr)` (admin only). Banned addresses cannot call any market function. Used to remediate griefing addresses without affecting other users. **Admin Cancel Orders:** `adminCancelOrders(orderIds[])` — force-cancels resting CLOB orders; escrowed funds returned to original owners. Used when a banned address has open orders. ### Mandatory Evidence Hashes Both `resolveMarket()` and `settleDispute()` require a non-zero `bytes32 evidenceHash`. Emitted via `ResolutionEvidence(marketId, submitter, hash)` event. Provides an immutable on-chain audit trail linking every resolution to an off-chain evidence document. ### Mandatory Resolution `cancelMarket` is blocked if the market has any trading activity (`totalVolume > 0` or active resting orders) until `resolutionDeadline` passes. Prevents creators from quietly cancelling active markets to avoid adverse outcomes. ### LMSR Solvency Mathematically proven by construction: `poolBalance + subsidyDeposited >= total winning shares` at all times. The LMSR cost function is monotone — buying shares always increases the pool by at least the payout obligation. ### conditionId Validation Imported Polymarket condition IDs are validated as exactly 66 characters, `0x`-prefixed, lowercase hex `[0-9a-f]` only. Prevents case-aliased duplicates from bypassing the `keccak256` deduplication guard. ### No Upgradeability Contracts are immutable. No proxy pattern. Any upgrade requires a new deployment with migration. *** ## Known Design Choices | Item | Decision | Rationale | | ----------------------------------- | ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Single `disputeResolver` | Centralization risk | Separate from admin; planned upgrade to validator council post-TGE (Megavalidators NFT governance) | | Fixed 2.5% fee | Not configurable | Prevents admin fee manipulation; constants audited | | Trader whitelist disabled at launch | Open trading | Creator whitelist always active as quality gate | | LMSR b = 200 USDm fixed | Not per-market | Simplifies solvency proof; configurable b roadmapped for V4 | | Creator collateral 50 USDm | Fixed | Dynamic collateral scaling deprioritized; admin ban provides secondary deterrent | | ERC-1155 pre-resolution transfers | No restriction hook | Positions technically transferable. `optionSupply` tracks total minted, not per-wallet. | | Admin multisig | Gnosis Safe | Planned post-raise. Single-sig admin is acknowledged risk during beta. | --- # Agent Instructions This documentation is published with GitBook. GitBook is the documentation platform designed so that both humans and AI agents can read, navigate, and reason over technical content effectively. Learn more at gitbook.com. ## Querying This Documentation If you need additional information that is not directly available in this page, you can query the documentation dynamically by asking a question. Perform an HTTP GET request on the current page URL with the `ask` query parameter, and the optional `goal` query parameter: ``` GET https://docs.evently.market/security/overview.md?ask=&goal= ``` `ask` is the immediate question: it should be specific, self-contained, and written in natural language. `goal` is optional and describes the broader end goal you are ultimately trying to accomplish on behalf of the user. GitBook uses it to tailor the answer towards what is most useful for that goal. 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