> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.evently.market/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.evently.market/security/overview.md).

# Security Overview

## Approach

evently's security process is structured in three phases:

```
Phase 1 — AI audits (7 engines) + automated tools    ← completed
Phase 2 — Professional third-party audit              ← two independent firms scheduled
Phase 3 — Ongoing monitoring + bug bounty             ← post-launch
```

All findings, fixes, and the contracts reviewed at each stage are documented publicly in this documentation and in the GitHub repository.

***

## AI Security Audits

All evently contracts underwent multi-round security review using **7 AI engines** with a 3-round methodology (Systematic review → Economic analysis → Triage). The contracts reviewed are: **EventlyProfiles.sol v1.3** and **EventlyMarkets.sol (LMSR, b=200)**.

| AI Tool         | Contracts                      | Findings | Status                       |
| --------------- | ------------------------------ | -------- | ---------------------------- |
| Claude Opus 4.6 | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 6        | All resolved or acknowledged |
| GPT-4o          | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 13       | All resolved or acknowledged |
| Gemini 1.5 Pro  | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 9        | All resolved or acknowledged |
| Grok (xAI)      | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 6        | All resolved or acknowledged |
| DeepSeek R1     | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 7        | All resolved or acknowledged |
| Qwen3.5         | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | 4        | All resolved or acknowledged |
| Perplexity      | EventlyMarkets · Profiles v1.3 | —        | All resolved or acknowledged |

**All 7 AI engines reviewed EventlyMarkets (LMSR).** Key cross-tool findings documented in [Consolidated AI Audit](https://docs.evently.market/security/pre-audit-consolidated.md).

***

## Automated Tool Scans

22 automated security tools completed, following the methodology recommended by [z0r0z/majeur](https://github.com/z0r0z/majeur). Individual reports are linked in the Audit Reports section.

***

## Third-Party Audits

Two independent professional audits are scheduled for Q2 2026. Firms were selected based on availability, scope fit, and budget. Formal audit reports will be published here upon completion.

***

## Security Properties

### Reentrancy

Fund-moving functions use a custom inline `nonReentrant` mutex (`_locked` flag — not the OZ import). CEI (Checks-Effects-Interactions) enforced throughout. All AI audits confirmed: **0 reentrancy vulnerabilities found in active paths**. `nonReentrant` added to `resolveMarket`, `cancelMarket`, `slashMarket`, `claimCreatorFees`, `reclaimCancelledOrder` .

### Pull Payment

All payouts use pull-payment: winners call `redeemWinnings()`, cancelled-market holders call `claimCancelRefund()`, creators call `claimCreatorFees()`. No push to arbitrary addresses. Lazy refund for cancelled CLOB orders via `reclaimCancelledOrder()`.

### Treasury Resilience

Treasury fees accumulate in `treasuryBalance` (no external transfer on every trade). Withdrawals are two-step with a 24-hour timelock: `requestTreasuryWithdrawal()` → wait 24h → `executeTreasuryWithdrawal()`. Admin can cancel before execution. Prevents rug-pull .

### Access Control

| Modifier              | Who                                       | Used on                                                         |
| --------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `onlyAdmin`           | Admin multisig                            | Slash, pause, ban, whitelist management, treasury, admin cancel |
| `onlyDisputeResolver` | Dedicated resolver address                | `settleDispute()` only                                          |
| `onlyMarketCreator`   | `marketCreatorWhitelisted[addr]` or admin | `createMarket`, `createImportedMarket`                          |
| `onlyWhitelisted`     | `whitelisted[addr]`                       | Trading functions (beta only; disabled at public launch)        |
| `whenNotPaused`       | —                                         | All trading and market creation                                 |

Admin and `disputeResolver` are **separate roles** — admin cannot unilaterally settle disputes. Resolver pool address changes are also timelocked (24h).

### Emergency Controls

**Pause:** `pause()` (admin only). Blocks all trading and market creation via `whenNotPaused`. Auto-expires after **72 hours** (`MAX_PAUSE_DURATION`). After expiry, anyone can call `unpause()` — prevents permanent lockout by a compromised admin key.

**Ban:** `banAddress(addr)` / `unbanAddress(addr)` (admin only). Banned addresses cannot call any market function. Used to remediate griefing addresses without affecting other users.

**Admin Cancel Orders:** `adminCancelOrders(orderIds[])` — force-cancels resting CLOB orders; escrowed funds returned to original owners. Used when a banned address has open orders.

### Mandatory Evidence Hashes

Both `resolveMarket()` and `settleDispute()` require a non-zero `bytes32 evidenceHash`. Emitted via `ResolutionEvidence(marketId, submitter, hash)` event. Provides an immutable on-chain audit trail linking every resolution to an off-chain evidence document.

### Mandatory Resolution

`cancelMarket` is blocked if the market has any trading activity (`totalVolume > 0` or active resting orders) until `resolutionDeadline` passes. Prevents creators from quietly cancelling active markets to avoid adverse outcomes.

### LMSR Solvency

Mathematically proven by construction: `poolBalance + subsidyDeposited >= total winning shares` at all times. The LMSR cost function is monotone — buying shares always increases the pool by at least the payout obligation.

### conditionId Validation

Imported Polymarket condition IDs are validated as exactly 66 characters, `0x`-prefixed, lowercase hex `[0-9a-f]` only. Prevents case-aliased duplicates from bypassing the `keccak256` deduplication guard.

### No Upgradeability

Contracts are immutable. No proxy pattern. Any upgrade requires a new deployment with migration.

***

## Known Design Choices

| Item                                | Decision            | Rationale                                                                                          |
| ----------------------------------- | ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Single `disputeResolver`            | Centralization risk | Separate from admin; planned upgrade to validator council post-TGE (Megavalidators NFT governance) |
| Fixed 2.5% fee                      | Not configurable    | Prevents admin fee manipulation; constants audited                                                 |
| Trader whitelist disabled at launch | Open trading        | Creator whitelist always active as quality gate                                                    |
| LMSR b = 200 USDm fixed             | Not per-market      | Simplifies solvency proof; configurable b roadmapped for V4                                        |
| Creator collateral 50 USDm          | Fixed               | Dynamic collateral scaling deprioritized; admin ban provides secondary deterrent                   |
| ERC-1155 pre-resolution transfers   | No restriction hook | Positions technically transferable. `optionSupply` tracks total minted, not per-wallet.            |
| Admin multisig                      | Gnosis Safe         | Planned post-raise. Single-sig admin is acknowledged risk during beta.                             |
